Scientists in Conflict:
Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, and the Shaping of United States Nuclear Policy, 1945-1972

      Few men have experienced as intimate or enduring a relationship with nuclear weapons as physicists Hans Bethe and Edward Teller, two of the luminaries of America’s wartime atomic bomb project. From that time, the bomb became an immutable part of the lives of both men, as they devoted a significant portion of their lengthy careers to arms-related research, as well as advising a series of administrations on the formulation of nuclear weapons policy. This study examines the adversarial roles of Bethe and Teller in the shaping of policy during four specific episodes: the post-war bid for disarmament (1945-1948); the development of the hydrogen bomb (1949-1954); the nuclear test ban negotiations (1954-1963); and the deployment of a limited system of ballistic missile defense (1964-1972). Each episode contrasts their individual motives, political agendas, means of affecting policy and respective degrees of success. The conclusion offers an appraisal of the two physicists as political advisors by considering the cogency of their advice concerning the Soviet nuclear program.

In a less than edifying analogy, journalist Susan Cohen once likened Bethe and Teller to “a couple after a bitter divorce, forced to grit their teeth and meet over the custody of their child;” only in their case, Cohen added, the “issue is the nuclear arsenal of the United States.” For many years, these once intimate friends were at the forefront of a heated intellectual dispute amongst U.S. nuclear scientists, the central issue of which was the capacity of nuclear weapons to ensure national security. By and large, the most notable participants in this dispute were those “politically relevant scientists” who held some influence over the decision-making process, and it is within the context of this broader debate that the views of Bethe and Teller are examined.

Contents

• A Prelude to Politics 1914-1945
• Political Novices on a National Stage 1945-1948
• The Hydrogen Bomb Controversy 1949-1952
• The Downfall of Oppenheimer the Rise of Teller 1953-1954
• Bethe, Teller and the Test Ban Debate 1954-1960
•  Defense or Deterrence: The Test Ban Debate Continues 1961-1963
• ABM and the Issue of Strategic Stability 1964-1968
• ABM, MIRV and Fear of a Soviet First Strike 1969-1972
• Conclusion

Publication Release Date: 15 May 2009

336 Pages (PB)                                                $24.95