United States and Two Gulf Wars:
Prelude and Aftermath
Illustrations, notes, biographical data, maps, and index.
In the
1980s and 1990s, Americans agreed that the role of the United States
in the Iraq-Iran war and in the first Gulf war generally served the nation’s basic
interests. Again, in 2002-2003, a majority of Americans accepted President
George W. Bush’s claim that Saddam Hussein’s threatening weapons of mass
destruction and his assistance to terrorists threatened the Western world and
they supported the decision to depose Hussein. U.S.
inspectors who fanned out across Iraq
to find the weapons of mass destruction subsequently issued a report that “contradicted nearly every prewar assertion
about Iraq
made by top Bush administration officials.”
Concentration on tactical
operations for the invasion of Iraq
and the failure to develop postwar strategic plans allowed the momentum created
by toppling Hussein to slip away. There was little realization of the resources
needed for reconstruction or the force requirements for internal security, nor
was there a plan for how to establish a new governing structure of Iraq. Moreover,
few Americans involved in the postwar period spoke the languages or possessed
an understanding of the Iraqi culture. All of this contributed to the growth of
an Iraqi insurgency, the resilience and effectiveness of which caught civilian
and military officials in Baghdad and Washington unprepared.
Many Democrats, independents and some
Republicans changed their minds about the Iraqi intervention after it became
evident Iraq had not possessed weapons of mass destruction, the insurgency
began taking an increasing number of American lives and no exit strategy was in
sight. A USA Today/Gallup of July 21-23, 2006, revealed only 37 percent of
Americans approved of Bush’s handling of the war’s aftermath, a factor that
contributed to the Democrats gaining control of Congress in January 2007.
Brune, L. H. 401 Pages (PB)
$ 19.95